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Public Sector Reform in Macao After
the Handover
Bill K.P. Chou
1 In  a  situation  where  available  resources  are  becoming  scarce,  governments  in
developed countries tend to face increasing public demand for improved government
performance and accountability1.  Most of the literature on public sector reform has
been  based  on  the  experience  of  Western  democracies2.  Some  have  focused  on
examples from Asian and developing countries3.  This  paper seeks to present public
sector reform in Macao following the handover from Portugal to China in December
1999.
Public sector and administrative problems in Macao
2 In 1999 Macao became China’s second Special  Administrative Region (SAR).  Macao’s
public  sector  is  small:  in  2002,  public  consumption accounted  for  11.41%  of  the
territory’s GDP4, with 17,488 civil servants in 20035. The government did not hold major
stakes in significant enterprises, with a few exceptions, such as TDM (Macao Television
and Radio Broadcast) (100% ownership) and Macao International Airport Company Ltd.
(55.25% ownership). It held an insignificant number of shares in a telecommunications
company (1%) and in the only electric company in the territory (8.19%)6.  The water
supply  company,  Macao  Water,  was  100%  privately  owned.  Owing  to  the  limited
government ownership of economic entities, the Macao government has limited room
to economise its  use  of  resources  through privatisation and retreat  from economic
activities.
3 Macao’s civil service was nevertheless expensive. The median monthly earnings of civil
servants were the highest among the 13 top occupations, and more than three times
the overall median in the territory7. Constitutional constraints tied the government’s
hands  on  pay  cuts:  Article  98  of  the  Macao  Basic  Law  (Macao’s  mini-constitution)
stipulated that civil servants were entitled to conditions of service no less than those
before the handover8. 
4 To economise on the use of resources, the government in recent years has often offered
short-term and part-time contracts to public employees whose salary was much closer
Public Sector Reform in Macao After the Handover
China Perspectives, 52 | march-april 2004
1
to  market  prices,  and  would  usually  renew  the  contracts  upon  contract  expiry.
Therefore, many of these types of employees were not temporary staff and served in
the civil service for several years9. Since these employees were not regarded as civil
servants and their number was not made public, the actual size of civil service was
certainly larger than official figures stated. 
5 The most high-ranking civil servants were the 58 bureau directors responsible to five
Secretaries who directly reported to the Chief Executive, the head of the government.
Bureau  directors  and  their  deputies  belonged  to  director  rank  (lingdao).  The
administrative units below bureaus were organised into departments (ting), divisions
(chu),  sectors  (zu),  and sections (ke)  in  descending hierarchical  order.  The heads of
these units were loosely classified as chief rank (zhuguan)10. The last two layers, sectors
and sections, had no legal status in the Organic Statute of Macao Special Administrative
Region11. 
6 The  shortcomings  of  the  civil  service  system  had  an  adverse  impact  upon
administrative efficiency. First, the government was by no means clear of traits of the
spoil  system inherited  from the  colonial  government,  and  institutionalised  a  merit
system in recruitment.  Competitive  recruitment examinations were not  mandatory.
Nepotism and patronage were rife and penetrated to lower-ranking positions. The five
Secretaries were authorised to create positions; it was not unusual for them to create
jobs  for  their  supporters  and  relatives12.  Open  recruitment  exercises  were  often
symbolic13.  The  promotion  process  was  sometimes  plagued  by  favouritism.  For
instance,  a  non legal-trained civil  servant well-connected with her patron could be
promoted to Deputy Director of Judicial Training Centre though the office bearer was
supposed to have a background of legal training14.
7 The thaws in the performance appraisal system of Macao’s civil service were another
source of administrative problems. Civil servants had to undergo annual performance
appraisal and were rated on a four-grade system: excellent, satisfactory, fair and poor.
Civil servants rated excellent or satisfactory for two consecutive years were entitled to
an upgrade within their pay scale. If contract staff were rated either fair or poor, their
employment contracts were not renewed. In the case of permanent staff, those rated
fair were unqualified for an increment; poor grades would result in disciplinary action.
However,  usually  over 98% of  civil  servants  were rated excellent  or  satisfactory:  in
1999, 5,746 out of 9,269 civil servants (excluding those in the disciplinary forces) got an
excellent grade and 3,496 were rated satisfactory. The remaining 27 were rated fair;
none received poor grades.  In the disciplinary forces,  the distribution of employees
over the four grades was 468 (9%), 4,394 (89%), 90 (2%), and 0 (0%) respectively. This
implied that  even mediocre  civil  servants  could receive  some sort  of  performance-
based reward.  Moreover,  civil  servants  at  director/chief  level  were not  required to
undergo performance appraisal. Thus civil servants were neither given adequate
feedback on their past performance nor were there the incentives to improve their
performance to move to a higher level15. 
8 Moreover, civil servants had the right to reject job transfers that resulted in too many
employees  within  a  restructured  department.  In  1999  the  government  set  up  the
Customs  Service  to  take  over  enforcement  of  Intellectual  Property  Act  from  the
Economic  Services  Bureau. As  some  civil  servants  refused  to  leave  the  Economic
Services Bureau, the Bureau became overstaffed. In contrast, the Customs Service was
understaffed and had to hire new employees16.
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9 The Legislative Assembly’s lack of prowess and determination to closely scrutinise the
administration  was  to  blame  for  certain  administrative  problems.  The  Legislative
Assembly  had  no  equivalent  of  the  specialised  subcommittees  that  existed  in  the
legislatures in other countries to examine government expenditure proposals on public
works projects and the creation of senior posts. The government was not required to
report  to  the  Legislative  Assembly  on  its  expenditure  once  the  annual  budget  was
approved17.  Most  members  of  the  Legislative  Assembly  were  pro-government,  and
unenthusiastic  about  supervising  the  government,  holding  it  accountable  for  its
policies, and institutionalising prudent public spending practices18. 
10 For  instance,  in  February  2004,  the  Legislative  Assembly  voted  down  a  motion
demanding the government to  set  up a  public  consultation mechanism in  the law-
making  process19.  In  September  2002,  the  Commissioner  of  Audit  (a  commission
performing cost-effective audits) exposed a scandal that involved the chairmen, vice-
chairmen, and full-time councillors of the former two Provisional Municipal Councils in
abuse  of  public  funds  in  23  instances,  such  as  using  the  councils’  credit  cards  for
shopping,  overpaying housing allowances,  and diverting housing allowances for the
renovation of their own apartments20. Despite this situation, the Legislative Assembly
voted down a motion requesting a public hearing and holding related officials
responsible21. During the 2000–2001 session, 23 (out of the total 27) members submitted
only 89 written questions and gave only 78 speeches on government work22. 
11 Management of public finance was not insufficiently effective to detect and prevent
wastage in time. About 15% of the government budget went to the government’s 38
financial  autonomous  organisations.  Unlike  government  departments,  these
autonomous organisations enjoyed high autonomy in spending. They were not obliged
to submit  their  annual  budgets  and financial  reports  for  the Legislative  Assembly’s
approval. In the past, these autonomous organisations had known serious problems of
abuse of  public  money,  such as  extravagances,  under-the-table  transactions,  sale  of
public property to supporters at unreasonably low prices, illicit offers of loans, and
intentional  under-estimation  of  their  own  organisations’  reserves  to  justify  larger
budget requests for the following year23. 
12 To tighten controls on expenditure, the Macao government set up the Commission of
Audit to scrutinise their spending and disclose financial mismanagement. Meanwhile,
the  government  compressed  the  budgetary  expenditure  of  the  autonomous
organisations from 6.52 billion in 2000 to 2.47 billion in 2004, and its own proportion of
the  government’s  gross  budgetary  expenditure  from  35%  to  15%24.  Nevertheless,
inadequate manpower prevented the Commission of Audit from auditing the financial
reports  of  all  these autonomous organisations every year.  In  2002,  the Commission
audited the financial reports of only ten autonomous organisations25. Hence, it was not
until 2003 that the Commission discovered the Government Tourist Office’s misuse of
the Tourism Fund since 200026. 
13 Last  but  not  least,  many  administrative  units  were  overlapping  in  their  roles.  The
Sports  Development  Bureau  and the  Civic  and Municipal  Affairs  Bureau  were  both
charged with managing sports facilities. The Lands, Public Work and Transport Bureau
shared  traffic  management  responsibilities  with  the  Civic  and  Municipal  Affairs
Bureaus27. The overlap was also to blame for bureaucracy in-fighting between the Civic
and Municipal Affairs Bureau and the Cultural Institute, as both were responsible for
organising performing arts activities, managing libraries and overseeing museums, and
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both  wanted  to  expand  their  jurisdictions  in  art  policy  and  administration28.
Furthermore,  such  overlaps  sometimes  complicated  administrative  procedure  and
increased the items for administrative approval. An application for restaurant licences,
for  instance,  required  approval  from  the  Civic  and  Municipal  Affairs  Bureau;
Government Tourist Office; the police; fire services; Health Bureau; Cultural Institute;
Labour Employment Bureau; and Land, Public Works and Transport Bureau29. Therefore
restaurant owners had to wait for over half a year for a licence30. 
The context and strategies of public sector reform
14 There  are  several  factors  that  made  undertaking  sweeping  public  sector  reform
possible. The first was the popularity of the Chief Executive Edmund Ho. His approval
rate ranged from 72% to 79% between March 2000 and February 200431. Ho’s popularity
was partly due to his inheritance of his father Ho Yin’s political assets. Before his death
in 1983,  Ho Yin had for over 30 years been the chief representative of the Chinese
community, serving as a bridge between Peking and Lisbon, the colonial government
and  the  public,  and  Chinese  businessmen  and  the  working  class.  He  was  a
philanthropist and financed much of the enclave’s social welfare at a time when the
state-sponsored social services were far from adequate. 
15 Edmund Ho was elected to the Legislative Assembly in 1988 and as vice-chairman of the
Legislative Assembly in 1992. His position as the vice-chairman not only denoted his
status as the chief representative of the Chinese community but also provided him with
ample opportunities to develop his political skills before he took the helm of the SAR in
199932. His success in stabilising the economy and public order, as discussed below, also
contributed to his huge public following.
16 The  second  factor  was  the  youth  and  inexperience  of  the  civil  servants.  Possibly
because of Portugal’s hidden agenda of protecting Macanese interests and preserving
the Portuguese cultural legacy after 1999, the colonial government in Macao dragged
its feet in localisation policy33. In 1987, Macao had 1,076 Portugal-born civil servants,
accounting for 10.69% of the total workforce. Their number peaked at 1,811 (12.35% of
all civil servants) in 199034. Portuguese filled most of the senior positions. By the end of
1997, only 14.81% and 40.00% of directors and deputy directors were local Chinese35.
The  Portuguese  government  alleged  that  the  under-secretaries  (the  supervisors  of
bureau  directors  and  the  highest-ranking  officials  next  to  the  Governor)  were
politically appointed but not career civil servants. Localisation did not extend to this
rank, and therefore local people could not be promoted to this rank until  after the
handover36.  Large scale replacement of Portuguese senior officials with Chinese civil
servants took place only after 1998. In consequence, after the handover many of the
senior civil servants were young and inexperienced. In 2001, only 99 out of 633 civil
servants at director/chief rank were at the age of 45 or above37. As a lot of high-ranking
civil  servants  lacked  senior  administrative  exposure,  they  were  inclined  to  be
submissive  to  authority.  Political  elites  need  not  worry  too  much  about  a  strong
bureaucratic  resistance  of  a  type  that  had  thwarted  many  countries’  structural
reforms38.
17 The  third  factor  was  the  economic  setback  at  the  turn  of  the  century.  Gambling
industry and tourism were the pillars of Macao’s economy. Rampant organised crime
kept tourists away and numbers fell from 8.15 million in 1996 to 6.95 million in 199839.
The impact this had on the gambling and tourist  industry,  together with the Asian
financial crisis in 1997, pushed gambling tax revenue from its peak of MOP6.1 billion in
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1997 to below MOP5 billion in 1998 and 199940. The real GDP growth rate fell from 3.3%
in 1995 to -4.6 in 199841. The unemployment rate rose from 2.7% in the fourth quarter of
1997 to 7.1% in the second quarter of 200042. 
18 Public sector reform that could bring about cost savings, improvements in efficiency
and service delivery was supposed to be a convenient vehicle for the enclave’s post-
handover government to bolster its legitimacy amid economic recession. However, in
his 2000 policy plan, the Chief Executive identified four strategies characterised by an
emphasis  more  on  improving  policy  outcomes  than  saving  on  costs:  restructuring
departments, enhancing a customer-oriented culture, rationalising the use of resources
and technology, and developing professional training for civil servants. There was no
mention of how to reduce administrative stratification, regulate the authority of senior
officials, and enhance the role of the Legislative Assembly or the Commission of Audit43.
Strategies  widely  adopted  by  OECD  countries,  such  as  devolution  of  managerial
authority,  establishment  of  productivity  targets  and  performance  indicators,  and
exploration of alternatives to bureaucracy in service provision, were excluded44.
19 In the following three years, the government departments concerned specified Edmund
Ho’s  reform  programme  strategies.  To  restructure  departments,  the  government
established the Civic and Municipal Affairs Bureau in 2001 to take over the functions of
the  Provisional  Macao  Municipal  Council  and  Provisional  Islands  Macao  Municipal
Council45. Judicial police and security forces, traditionally opponents and belonging to
separate  functional  bureaucracies,  were  placed  under  the  uniform  direction  of  the
Unitary  Police  Service.  The  2005  East  Asian  Games  Office  was  incorporated.  Macao
Prison was removed from the Legal Affairs Bureau to become an independent bureau-
level  department.  The  Post  and  Telecommunications  Office  was  renamed  the  Post
Office, and its responsibility in telecommunications policy was transferred to a newly
established  Office  for  the  Development  of  Telecommunications  and  Information
Technology. The Coloane-Taipa Reclamation Office merged with the Incineration and
Discharged Water Office to form the Office for Infrastructure Development46. The New
Birth Registration Bureau merged with the Deceased Registration Bureau to form the
Civil Affairs Registration Bureau47. 
20 Many of these reform programmes however, missed the core issues. The department
restructuring had little to do with resolving the problems of role overlapping, nor did it
shrink the scope of government activities. Rather, the scope has expanded since the
handover, as evidenced by the government’s abolishing of two autonomous provisional
municipal councils and turning them into a government department―the Civic and
Municipal  Affairs Bureau,  as well  as taking over TDM in 2002.  Hence the impact of
department restructuring on administrative efficiency was limited48. 
21 The reform programmes regarding strengthening a  customer-oriented environment
included  making  performance  pledges,  setting  up  one-stop  service  centres,  and
establishing  complaints  offices  in  government  departments. By the  end  of  October
2003, 39 departments out of the total 45 departments providing direct public services
had produced 840 performance pledges. Meanwhile, nine departments had set up 12
one-stop service centres aimed at simplifying administrative procedures by merging
related departments into single offices49. Though one-stop service centres made making
certain government-related applications easier, the items of administrative approval
were reportedly not reduced. In fact, in order to overcome the hurdles caused by the
items and ambiguities in administrative approvals, applicants were used to paying for
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services  from  middlemen  who  enjoyed  reciprocity  with  the  senior  civil  servants
responsible for the approvals.  Since removal of  the approval  items and ambiguities
would  dispense  with  the  middlemen’s  service  and  undermine  their  interests,  some
departments had little incentive to simplify administrative procedures50. 
22 With  respect  to  using  technology  and  resources  more  rationally,  in  2001  the
government  formed  a  steering  committee  to  study  the  development  of  electronic
public administrative services, and installed an ISO9001 quality management system in
departments and autonomous organisations.  The first  department using the system
was the Identification Department51. In 2003, the government reviewed the civil service
appraisal system to improve its feedback mechanisms on employee performance and
oblige all civil servants at director/chief level to undergo annual appraisal. Appraisal
commissions were set up in all departments to verify performance appraisal results and
assure greater fairness and transparency. Nevertheless, this still did not address the
issue of insufficient discrimination applied to the past performance appraisal system52.
23 In addition, the government proposed a staff transferral system53. Under the current
system, opportunities of postings to other departments were very limited. Almost all
promotion and staff redeployment took place within the same department. Even the
most qualified civil servants were possibly barred from promotion if those more senior
were  younger  and  no  new  senior  positions  were  available.  This  severely  hindered
career advancement opportunities and staff motivation54. 
24 With regard to professional training, the government commissioned the Civil Service
College of Singapore to provide an Executive Management Development Programme
for  over  600  middle-  and  high-ranking  civil  servants55.  Job-related  skills  training
covering  law,  secretarial  work,  management,  computer  skills,  and  language  were
stepped up56. Portuguese language training was a main component of language training
as not many Chinese civil servants had a command of Portuguese. In 2001, less than
50% of civil servants could read and write both Chinese and Portuguese57. All official
and legal documents produced before the handover were still in Portuguese. Owing to
the meagre success of the localisation of the legal system and official use of Chinese
language,  only  important  policy  announcements  and decrees  were  translated  into
Chinese.  Even  though  some  decrees  were  in  Chinese,  they  were  sometimes
incomprehensible because of tight translation schedules and the resulting poor quality
of the translations58. 
25 1. Size of public sector (1996–2000)
NB : * Data 2002.
(1) Including civilian employees and employees in education, health and police.  
(2) Including civilian employees and employees in public schools and police.
(3) Including civilian employees.
(4) Including civilian employees and employees in education and health sector.
Sources: Government of Macao Special Administrative Region Statistics, 2003. Macao: Human Resources
Statistics, Public Administration and Civil Service Bureau, 2003. Statistics, Civil Service Bureau, the
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Regio, 2003. Hong Kong : The Facts – Population, 2003. 
Administrative and Civil Service Reform, World Bank Group, 2003, available at http://
www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/development.htm. 
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26 The language  issues  may delay  the  administrative  process.  For  instance,  pollutants
produced  by  an  air-conditioned  warehouse  reportedly  provoked  many  complaints.
Although anti-pollution ordinances forbidding pollution were available,  government
officials were uncertain which provisions in the ordinance were breached59. Stepping
up  Portuguese  language  training  was  a  necessary  means  to  resolving  a  major
administrative bottleneck. However, very often the time spent on training courses was
not  counted  as  work  time,  so  there  was  little  incentive  to  attend.  In  addition,  the
courses usually did not vigorously test the capacity of the trainees,  and instructors
were not well assessed. The quality of training courses could hardly be assured60.
Reasons for prudent public sector reform programmes
27 Moon and Ingraham argued that  outcome of  public  policies  are  determined by the
relative strength of three major actors―bureaucrats, politicians, and society61. Given
submissive bureaucrats and a civil society dependent on the government, politicians
were  the  most  influential  actors  in  shaping policy  outcomes62.  Because  of  the  high
approval rate of the Chief Executive and the timidity of legislators as discussed, the
reasons why many public sector reform programmes did not address the core issues of
the administrative problems should be traced back to the Chief Executive. 
28 The Chief Executive was more concerned about maintaining administrative stability
than bashing the bureaucracy when it came to the quality of public service63. Also, in
parallel with public opinion, the Chief Executive placed a higher priority on economic
development  and social  order  than public  sector  reform.  In  a  survey  conducted in
March 2000, 44.5% and 24.5% of respondents regarded economic affairs and social order
as the issues that concerned them most. Only 8.8% chose administrative problems64. 
29 In 2000, economic growth returned and in 2003, the GDP at constant prices increased by
15.6%. The unemployment rate dropped gradually to below 6% by the end of 200365.
Social order was also restored. In 2001, violent crime dropped by 25.3% compared with
the previous year66. Visitor numbers increased and boosted gambling tax revenues to
MOP 5.34 billion in 2000 and MOP 6.13 billion in 2001. In 2002, the government raised
the gambling tax rate from 31.8% to 35%. In 2003 a historical high of over MOP 9 billion
in gambling tax revenue was recorded67.  The government accumulated a big budget
surplus (from MOP 314.2 million in 2000 to MOP 3.90 billion in 2003)68 and enjoyed high
approval ratings (over 70% between March 2000 and February 2004).  A longitudinal
study revealed that in 2001 Macao people were more satisfied with the government
than in 199969. Budget surplus and high approval ratings made it pointless to cut costs
or bolster legitimacy through public sector reform which, as seen in many overseas
examples, often stirs controversy within bureaucracy70.
30 The constraints  of  legal  traditions  may also  account  for  a  lack of  sweeping reform
measures. Macao inherited from Portugal a continental legal tradition. Unlike common
law  regions  in  which  the  exercise  of  executive  power  is  sufficient  to  initiate  far-
reaching structural reform71,  regions with a tradition of codified civil  law would be
confronted with massive legal barriers and severely delayed in their pursuit of public
sector  reform72.  For  example,  organic  statutes  regulated  the  set-up  of  government
departments.  Establishing  new departments,  abolishing  old  departments,  modifying
department  functions,  and  changing  department  establishment  all  entail  law
amendments. Similarly, reforming staffing, performance appraisal systems, and staff
transferral required amendments to the Civil Service Act. Given the necessity of bi-
lingual (Chinese and Portuguese) legislation and a shortage of bilingual civil servants
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and  legal  experts,  introduction  of  reform  measures  targeting  the  core  issues  of
administrative problems cannot be realised in a short period of time. 
31 Public sector reform in Macao did not address core problems in the public sector in
Macao,  i.e.  poor  personnel  practices,  the  inadequate  strength  of  the  Legislative
Assembly and the Commission of Audit, and the overlapping roles among government
departments. This was due to a Chief Executive more concerned about economic issues
and  social  order  than  public  sector  reform,  in  which  some  civil  servants  were
inexperienced. Furthermore, drastic structural reform aimed at cutting costs was also
deemed  both  unnecessary  amid  economic  recovery,  and  impossible  in  a  law-based
administrative system.
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